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NOTE
THE SKINNY ON THE FOP FLOP: WHY THE FDA
MUST TIGHTEN THE BELT ON FOP LABELING IN
LIGHT OF THE OBESITY CRISIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American obesity crisis is in desperate need of governmental
intervention.' Obesity has been called the "most prevalent, fatal,
chronic, relapsing disorder" of the twenty-first century. 2 Approximately
200 million adult Americans, or 66.3% of the population, are
overweight. 3 More than half of that group, or one-third of adults,
classify as obese.4 In the past thirty years, obesity rates for adults have
doubled, and even more alarming, the rates for children have tripled.'
During the last half-century, the average height for adults has grown by
one inch, while the average weight has risen by twenty-five pounds.6
As waistlines have ballooned, so have the medical costs of obesity.
Annual national costs swelled from $117 billion per year in 20008 to an
1. See The Supersizing of America: The FederalGovernment's Role in Combating Obesity
and Promoting Healthy Living: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 46,
47-48, 52-53 (2004) (statement of Lynn C. Swann, Chairman, President's Council on Physical
Fitness and Sports), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/108hrg/95914.pdf
("The federal government needs to stimulate all levels of government ... to join with us to attack
the obesity epidemic and its attendant health problems."); see also id. at 52-53 ("We need our
government to stand squarely behind initiatives and interventions to stress and encourage all
Americans to be physically active every day, to eat a nutritious diet, to get preventive screenings,
and to avoid risky behaviors. These are the four pillars of the President's Healthier US initiative.").
2. What is Obesity, OBESITY Soc'Y, http://www.obesity.org/information/what-is-obesity.
asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
OBESITY: HALTING THE EPIDEMIC BY MAKING HEALTH EASIER 2 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/

chronicdisease/resources/publications/AAG/pdf/obesity.pdf (showing that in the same thirty-year
time period, obesity rates for American children have tripled).
6. What is Obesity, supra note 2.
7.

See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 5, at 2 (showing that

between 1987 and 2001, diseases linked to obesity caused a twenty-seven percent increase in
medical costs).
8. See id.
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approximate $147 billion per year in 2008.9 Compared to an American
of normal weight, medical costs for an obese citizen are roughly fortytwo percent higher, or $1429 more per year.10 These figures reflect the
countless health risks associated with obesity, including Type 2 diabetes,
high cholesterol, hypertension, gallstones, sleep apnea, stress
incontinence, heart failure, fatty liver disease, degenerative joint disease,
birth defects, miscarriages, and asthma." In addition, obesity triggers
more than 100,000 cases of cancer per year in the United States.12
Consequently, obesity causes at least 112,000 excess deaths per year in
the United States.' 3 These statistics explain why Americans have the
second-worst life expectancy in the industrialized world, ahead only of

Latvia.14
Despite the overwhelming size of this problem, until recently, the
nation largely ignored the obesity epidemic.15 Stigmas against obese
people-characterizing them as lazy failures who were responsible for

9. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer- and
Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF., w822, w822 (2009), http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/28/5/w822. Significantly, half of the $147 billion in annual costs must be paid
by public funds, through Medicare and Medicaid. Id.; JENNIFER L. HARRIS ET AL., THE RUDD CTR.
FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, CEREAL F.A.C.T.S.: EVALUATING THE NUTRITION QUALITY AND

MARKETING OF CHILDREN'S CEREALS

10 (2009), http://www.cerealfacts.org/media/Cereal

FACTSReport.pdf [hereinafter RUDD CTR.].
10. Finkelstein et al., supra note 9, at w828.

11. What is Obesity, supranote 2.
12. Maggie Fox & Alan Eisner, Obesity Causes 100,000 U.S. Cancer Cases, Group Says,
REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A45Bl20091106. The American
Institute for Cancer Research estimated that if every American woman was at a healthy weight, 49%
of endometrium cancer cases (affecting the uterus) would be prevented, saving 20,700 women from
the disease per year. See id.; Learn About Cancer: Endometrial (Uterine) Cancer, AM. CANCER
SOC'Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/EndometrialCancer/DetailedGuide/endometrial-uterine-cancerwhat-is-endometrial-cancer (last updated Aug. 18, 2010). In addition, assuming all Americans
maintained a healthy weight, there would be 17% less breast cancer cases (or 33,000 less affected
people per year), and 28% fewer pancreatic cancer cases (or 11,900 less affected people per year).
See Fox & Eisner, supra.

13.

What is Obesity, supranote 2.

14. See MARK BiITMAN, FOOD MATTERS: A GUIDE TO CONSCIOUS EATING 57 (2009).
15. See KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY, AMERICA'S OBESITY CRISIS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 14

(2004); Rogan Kersh & James A. Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public Health,
30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 839, 842 (2005) ("Obesity's rise to political prominence-to a crisis
demanding action-has been astonishingly swift.. .. The surgeon general issued an alarm, in the
form of the first official report on obesity, in 2001.").
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solving their own health problems-precluded government action.16
Moreover, because obesity is often impervious to treatment, biological
research overlooked prevention.17 According to nutrition experts,
"[m]ost alarming has been the national inaction in the face of crisis, the
near-total surrender to a powerful food industry, and the lack of
innovation in preventing further havoc."' 8
Many nutritionists see the food industry as a cunning culprit in
keeping obesity on the national backburner.t 9 The food industry
"pressures legislators, attempts to influence national nutrition guidelines,
and opposes measures such as food labeling that would help consumers
understand what they are eating. The industry is organized, well-funded,
and expert at lobbying, and hence has friends in high places and
formidable power."20
Notwithstanding these criticisms, on its face, the food industry
attempts to fight obesity by marketing healthier products and providing
16. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 15; Colleen L. Barry et al., Obesity
Metaphors: How Beliefs About the Causes of Obesity Affect Support for PublicPolicy, 87 MILBANK
Q. 7, 19, 39 (2009), available at http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/8701feat.pdf. Stigmas are so
strong that the public blames the obese not only for their own problems, but also for more farreaching issues, like global warming. See Gina Kolata, For a World of Woes, We Blame Cookie
Monsters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006, § 6 (Week in Review), at 14. A political cartoon in The New
York Times, entitled "How Obese People Are Responsible For Everything Bad," lampooned these
stigmas. See id. Cartoonist Ron Barrett channeled Rube Goldberg to show a series of absurd steps
linking obesity to global warming. Id.; see RUBE GOLDBERG, http://www.rubegoldberg.com (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010). Barrett's cartoon explained:
(1) Obese person eats cake, causing. . . (2) button to pop from shirt, turning on propane
torch ... (3) which causes global warming and ... (4) heats water, killing endangered
species. (5) Condensed water causes flower to grow ... (6) tipping box containing
nuclear secrets ... (7) which fall into a spy's hands, causing nuclear proliferation. (8)
Spy runs away on a treadmill, which turns a buzz saw that ... (9) cuts down a Brazilian
Rain Forest.
Kolata, supra.
17. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 15.
18. Id. at3.
19. See Kelly D. Brownell & Kenneth E. Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big
Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar Is Big Food?, 87 MILBANK Q. 259, 265
(2009), available at http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/industry/Food
ITobacco.pdf. Brownell and Warner compiled a list of the food industry's main tactics in its strategy
to eschew blame, such as: "Focus[ing] on personal responsibility as the cause of the nation's
unhealthy diet" and "[v]ilify[ing] critics with totalitarian language, characterizing them as the food
police, leaders of a nanny state, and even 'food fascists,' and accuse them of desiring to strip people
of their civil liberties." Id.; see also BITTMAN, supra note 14, at 40 (claiming that the food
industry's profit motives have a detrimental effect on public health); BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra
note 15, at 15 (asserting that the food industry keeps obesity "low on the national agenda");
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH

358-59 (rev. ed. 2007) (claiming that the food industry uses various coercive tactics to intentionally
confuse the public and the government).
20. BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 15 (footnote omitted); see NESTLE, supra note
19, at 358, 361.
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increased nutritional information. 2 1 A telling example is the recent effort
by the food industry in sponsoring the Smart Choices Program ("Smart
Choices"), a uniform, front-of-package ("FOP") nutrition labeling
campaign designed to help supermarket shoppers make smarter food and
beverage choices.22 Smart Choices used a green checkmark symbol to
endorse food and beverages in nineteen different product categories. 23 It
also displayed the amount of servings and calories per serving on the
front of the packages in an effort to educate consumers.2 4
Although a nonprofit organization, the Keystone Center, developed
Smart Choices, members of the food industry joined scientists and
consumers in establishing its nutritional guidelines. 2 5 The food
companies bankrolled the cost of these nutrition-development meetings,
which totaled more than $680,000.26 In addition, from 2008 to 2009,
fourteen corporations contributed $1.47 million to sponsor the creation
of Smart Choices.27

21. BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 253-54. The food industry takes a strong public
stance against obesity:
The food companies say the right words. Food industry websites have information on
nutrition and physical activity, they support coalitions that promote changes in diet and
exercise, they say they are working to develop healthier products, and they state with no
ambiguity that they are committed to the health of the nation.
Id. See generally Lisa L. Sharma et al., The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to
Promote Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240 (2010)
(analyzing the food industry's self-regulatory pledges to see whether they promote public health or
whether they are deceptive).
22. SMART CHOICES PROGRAM, http://www.smartchoicesprogram.com (last visited Oct. 1,
2010) (explaining the motivation of the Smart Choices Program).
23. See id.
24. Id.; see Sharma et al., supra note 21, at 242.
25. See Rebecca Ruiz, Smart Choices Foods: Dumb as They Look?, FORBES.COM (Sept. 17,
2009,
6:25
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/17/smart-choices-labels-lifestyle-healthfoods.html (reporting that the Keystone Center assembled a team of forty food executives,
academics, health advocates, and government officials to create the campaign's nutritional criteria);
Nutrition Criteria & Calorie Indicator, SMART CHOICES PROGRAM, http://www.smartchoices
program.com/nutrition.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (explaining that the team used nutritional
guidelines from the Dietary Guidelines of Americans and the Institute of Medicine to develop the
criteria).
26. See Ruiz, supra note 25.
27. See id. (claiming that the program "has been portrayed as in the corner of industry; food
companies that participate fund the program annually based on a sliding scale ranging from $5,000
to $100,000").
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Despite the industry's good intentions, 28 nutrition experts and
members of the public lambasted Smart Choices soon after it hit shelves
in the summer of 2009.29 Critics questioned the program's nutritional
criteria after it endorsed more than eight hundred products, including
sugary cereals like Kellogg's Froot Loops and Frosted Flakes.30 As one
critic observed, "you can put vitamins and minerals in garbage and it
will meet the nutritional requirements as long as the garbage is low in
fat." 3 1 Nutritionists alleged that because the food industry dominated the
development panel, it skewed Smart Choices' nutritional criteria, setting
a low benchmark to include as many products as possible.3 2 According
to Michael Jacobson, the executive director of the Center for Science in
the Public Interest, who resigned from the Smart Choices panel in
28. See id. According to Richard Kahn, the former chief scientific and medical officer for the
American Diabetic Association and a member of the Smart Choices panel: "If you get someone who
has diabetes and they're eating doughnuts for breakfast ... anything down the ladder is a better
choice." Id. Mike Hughes, the Chairman of Smart Choices, offered a similar explanation of the
program's goals: "The purpose is to help people make choices about healthier food and to make
different selections than they are making now .... We believe the Smart Choices program, taken in
its total, will encourage people to eat in line with the US. Dietary Guidelinesfor Americans." CBS
Evening News: Food Feud (CBS television broadcast Sept. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5291349n&tag-api.
29. See, e.g., Carly Smolak, "Smart Choices" Food Label Recommends "Froot Loops,"
TRIPLE PUNDIT (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/09/smart-choices-food-labelclaims-froot-loops-are-a-okay/ ("[lt is in the interest of [Smart Choices] to stamp a label on the
most widely consumed products-processed foods-the same products that are largely responsible
for America's obesity epidemic."); Six Reasons "Smart Choices" Food Labeling Won't Help
Shoppers, FOODUCATE BLOG (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.fooducate.com/blog/2009/08/07/sixreasons-smart-choices-food-labeling-wont-help-shoppers/ (describing why Smart Choices fails to
help shoppers, including the program's "[1]enient [b]enchmark" for nutritional criteria). But see
Sharma et al., supra note 21, at 242 ("One part of the Smart Choices approach, the labeling of
servings and calories on the front of packages, is likely to be uncontroversial and helpful because it
is factual, requires no standards or interpretation, and can be defended as a consumer's right to
know.").
30. See Ruiz, supra note 25. Among the eight hundred products that Smart Choices endorsed
were Unilever Fudgsicles, which are low in fat and have only sixty calories (but also contain three
different kinds of sugar and have nearly no nutritional value), and Kraft's Bagel-fuls, which are
bagels stuffed with cream cheese. See id. Froot Loops quickly became the "poster child" for critics
of Smart Choices, as sugar constitutes forty percent of the product by weight. Nightline: Food Label
Fight (ABC television broadcast Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/video/
playerlndex?id=8617340; see Christopher Wanjek, New "Smart Choices" Food Labels are
Deceptive, LIVESCIENCE (Sept. 9, 2009, 7:25 AM), http://www.livescience.com/health/090909smart-choices-food-labels.html ("[Froot] Loops, Frosted Flakes and just about any other
commercial breakfast cereal also get the Smart Choices seal of approval, a big green checkmark,
apparently for being a smarter choice for breakfast compared to rock candy.").
31. Nightline, supra note 30 (interviewing food writer Mark Bittman about Smart Choices'
nutritional criteria).
32. See William Neuman, For Your Health, Froot Loops, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at Bl;
Smolak, supra note 29 (criticizing the fact that fees for participation in Smart Choices are based on
the sales of the products that carry the seal); FOODUCATE BLOG, supra note 29.
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September 2008: "It was paid for by industry and when industry put
down its foot and said this is what we're doing, that was it, end of
story."33
Criticism of Smart
Choices
spurred political action.
Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) urged the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration ("FDA") to investigate whether products bearing the
Smart Choices checkmarks were misbranded.
In response to
Congresswoman DeLauro and other critics, the FDA announced in
October 2009 that it had concerns about FOP labeling "which extend
beyond any particular program," and that it planned to develop national,
uniform guidelines to address the concerns.3 s The FDA's announcement
prompted Smart Choices to "postpone active operations" 36 and within

33. Neuman, supra note 32. Jacobson echoed Mark Bittman in his criticism of the nutritional
criteria, claiming, "[y]ou could start out with some sawdust, add calcium or Vitamin A and meet the
criteria." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also
Wanjek, supra note 30 ("[T]he guidelines are so skewed by industry that they are laughable.").
34. See Press Release, Congresswoman Rosa L. DeLauro, DeLauro Calls for FDA
Investigation into "Smart Choices" Labeling (Sept. 21, 2009), http://delauro.house.gov/release.
cfm?id=2653 ("I am very concerned that the Smart Choices program ... is using criteria that are not
stringent enough to protect consumers from misleading claims.").
35. See Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm'r of Food & Drugs, to Rosa L. DeLauro,
Chairwoman, House Appropriations Subcomm. on Agric. Rural Dev., FDA & Related Agencies,
(Oct.
19,
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/LabelClaims/ucml 87369.htm
[hereinafter Letter from Hamburg to DeLauro]; see also Letter from Barbara 0. Schneeman, Dir.,
FDA Office of Nutrition, Labeling & Dietary Supplements, to the Food Industry (Oct. 2009),
http://www.fda.goviFood/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodL
abelingNutrition/ucml87208.htm [hereinafter Letter from Schneeman to the Food Industry]
(containing nonbinding recommendations as a "[gluidance for [i]ndustry"). The FDA did not
specifically identify any products or provide a timeline for its actions. FDA Cracks Down on
Deceptive FoodLabels, CBS NEWS.COM (Oct. 20,2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/
20/health/main5402704.shtml. However, Commissioner Hamburg did acknowledge Smart Choices
during a call with the media, stating: "There are products that have gotten the Smart Choices check
mark that are almost 50 percent sugar." Id. Moreover, in August 2009, the FDA sent Smart Choices
a letter alerting the program that the FDA planned to closely monitor the FOP market. See Letter
from Michael R. Taylor, FDA Senior Advisor for Food Safety, Dept. of Health & Human Servs. &
Jerold R. Mande, Deputy Undersecretary for Food Safety, Dep't of Agric., to Sarah Krol, Gen.
Manager, Smart Choices Program (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/Food/Labeling
Nutrition/LabelClaims/ucm I80146.htm.
36. Press Release, Smart Choices Program, Smart Choices Program Postpones Active
Operations, (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.smartchoicesprogram.com/pr_091023_operations.html; see
Jacob Goldstein, Food Companies Make More Health Claims; FDA Pushes Back, WALL ST. J.
HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 23, 2009, 4:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/10/23/food-companiesmake-more-health-claims-fda-pushes-back/ ("'Smart Choices,' a food industry labeling program
that launched this summer and was backed by a bunch of food-business heavyweights will
'voluntarily postpone active operations,' according to a statement released this afternoon.").
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one week, caused eight major food manufacturers to withdraw from the
program.37
The FDA has yet to issue its new FOP guidelines. However, in its
announcement, the agency said:
We want to work with the food industry-retailers and manufacturers
alike-as well as nutrition and design experts and the Institute of
Medicine, to develop an optimal, common approach to nutrition related
FOP ... labeling that all Americans can trust and use to build better
diets and improve their health. 38
Smart Choices posted this announcement on its website, beneath a
banner reading "Group Welcomes Opportunity to Collaborate on Frontof-package Labeling with the FDA."39
This Note will argue that the food industry is an untrustworthy ally,
and that in light of the burgeoning obesity epidemic in the United States,
the federal government must act independently in creating a uniform
FOP labeling scheme. Part II will discuss the conflict between public
health aims and the profit-driven food industry. Part III will explore this
conflict by examining the legal history and the current framework for
federal nutrition labeling. Then, Part IV will analyze recent labeling
37. See Nick Rees, Eight Food Manufacturers Agree to Drop Smart Choices Logo,
LEGALNEWSLINE.COM (Oct. 29, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/223709eight-food-manufacturers-agree-to-drop-smart-choices-logo. In response to Connecticut Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal's request that the manufacturers eliminate the logo from their products,
"[tihe eight manufacturing giants-ConAgra Foods, General Mills, Inc., Kellogg Company, Kraft
Foods, PepsiCo, Inc., Riviana Foods, Sun-Maid and Unilever-will remove the logo at least until
Blumenthal's investigation and a new [FDA] investigation are completed." Id.
38. Letter from Schneeman to the Food Industry, supra note 35; see also About the IOM,
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, http://iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last updated July 15, 2010, 2:24 PM)
("The Institute of Medicine (IOM) is an independent, nonprofit organization that works outside of
government to provide unbiased and authoritative advice to decision makers and the public."). In
March 2010, the Commissioner of the FDA, Margaret Hamburg again announced the FDA's desire
to work with the food industry:
I believe we now have a wonderful opportunity to make a significant advancement in
public health if we can devise a [FOP] labeling system that consumers can understand
and use. We intend to work closely with food manufacturers, retailers, and others in the
design process, and I hope that every food processor will contribute its views on how we
can do this in the best way possible.
Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm'r of Food & Drugs, to the Food Industry (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202733.htm (emphasis added).
39. Press Release, Smart Choices Program, supra note 36. In its announcement, Smart
Choices quoted its chairman, Mike Hughes: "Our nutrition criteria are based on sound, consensus
science.... But with the FDA's announcement this week that they will be addressing [FOP
systems], and that uniform criteria may follow, it is more appropriate to post pone [sic] active
operations and ... to support [the FDA's] initiative." Id.; see William Neuman, F.D.A. to Clarify
Standardsfor the Front of Food Labels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at B3. According to Hughes:
"We also look forward to the opportunity to participate in [the FDA's] initiatives on [FOP]
labeling." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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actions taken by the food industry to show that it cannot be trusted.
Part V will assert that the federal government must act independent from
the food industry in developing its uniform FOP labeling regulations.
Further, Part V will suggest possible FOP regulations. Finally, this Note
will conclude that, as a matter of public health, to combat the obesity
crisis, the FDA must adopt objective nutritional criteria for its FOP
labeling scheme.

II.

HOT POTATO: THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE FOOD INDUSTRY AND
PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS

Throughout history, there has always been a conflict between
industry and public health goals. 4 0 The impact of the tobacco industry
offers the most salient comparison to the current struggle between the
food industry and public health aims:41
Legislators, the press, and the public were flabbergasted when tobacco
industry CEOs testified that nicotine is not addictive. This helped
sensitize the nation to how badly industry leaders can behave when
money and power are at stake. Decades from today, history will look
back on how legislators, the press, and the public are responding right
now to claims by the food industry that they support public health, to
statements that their products are not contributing to obesity, and to
their pleas not to be demonized. 42

40. RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 60. See generally Brownell & Warner, supra note 19
(comparing the tobacco industry to the food industry and evaluating how both industries have goals
contrary to public health).
41. See Julie Neal, Childhood Obesity Prevention: Is Recent Legislation Enough?, 27 J. Juv.
L. 108, 112-15, 121 (2006) (asserting that the campaign against tobacco addiction provides helpful
guidelines in the campaign against obesity); see also BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 255
(comparing the "dreadful history" of the tobacco industry to the current food industry). See
generally Brownell & Warner, supra note 19 (asserting that there are many similarities between the
food and tobacco industry). Often, "industry talks about the moral high ground but does not occupy
it." Id. at 260.
42. BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 255; see Neal, supra note 41, at 121 ("The
tobacco crisis exemplifies the difficulty of dealing with a national health crisis when legislators on
the national level are unwilling or unable to act in order to eliminate the crisis.").
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There is a major conflict of interest between the food industry and
public health aims.43 It is "no exaggeration to say that public health has
been sacrificed at the altar of profits, and that current food policy,
although not quite the worst [it has] ever been, is sorely lacking."" The
food industry competes for consumers' purchases with profits, not
nutrition, as the main goal. 4 5 Because most food companies are publicly
traded corporations, they must report quarterly to Wall Street and meet
profit and growth demands.4 6 Renowned nutritionist Marion Nestle47
further explains: "Companies must sell more, and then more, and even
more. In this kind of investment economy, weight gain is just collateral
damage." 4 8
Nutrition experts argue that the food industry's influence on
nutrition policy is dangerous to public health aims. 4 9 Food companies
lobby the government for their individual, private aims, and often
fiscally entangle themselves with nutrition experts.50 Thus, it is nearly
impossible for nutritionists and food professionals to remain
independent when they join alliances with food companies. 5' The "food
industry frames such tactics as promoting individual liberty and free
will, [but] its true objective is (not surprisingly) 'trade and unrestricted
profit."' 5 2 Therefore, when the government or other private groups court
the food industry's involvement, it "scream[s] conflict of interest, but the
danger is being ignored."5 3
43. See BITTrMAN, supra note 14, at 40; Emily J. Schaffer, Is the Fox Guardingthe Henhouse?
Who Makes the Rules in American Nutrition Policy?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 371,406 (2002) ("Much
ink has been spilled by nutritionists bemoaning the food industry's influence over the content of
nutrition information bearing the government's imprimatur.. . . [T]he dietary recommendations
offered by the government. . . reflect significant industry influence and politically motivated
concessions."); see also Brownell & Warner, supra note 19, at 265 (noting that one feature of the
food industry's "strategy" is to "[sltate there are no good or bad foods; hence no food or food
type ... should be targeted for change"); supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing
nutritionists' perceptions of the food industry's attempts to influence public policy).
44. BITTMAN, supranote 14, at 40.
45. See MARION NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 12 (2006); Jess Alderman et al., Application of Law
to the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90, 101 (2007) ("When the goal of
public health is incommensurate with this profit-seeking end, it will be set aside.").
46. NESTLE, supra note 45, at 13.
47. See About Marion Nestle, FOOD POLITICS, http://www.foodpolitics.com/about/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010) (explaining Marion Nestle's qualifications as a nutrition expert, including her
current role as the Paulette Goddard Professor in the Department of Nutrition, Food Studies, and
Public Health at New York University).
48. NESTLE, supra note 45, at 13.
49. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 280.
50. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 361.
51. Id. at 371.
52. Id. at 361; Alderman et al., supra note 45, at 102.
53. BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 280.
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Moreover, if it helps sell products, companies will use nutrition as a
marketing tool. 5 4 While its promotion of health may be sincere, the food
industry's insistence that it should be involved in government decisions
and that it shares public health goals could also be an ingenious way to
block critics. 5 Thus, nutritionists argue that the food industry "cannot
raise [its] flag on the high ground by making superficial efforts, boasting
of them, and all the while aggressively marketing high-sugar, high-fat,
high-calorie products, cultivating children as customers, selling problem
foods in schools, and the like." 56
By inviting involvement of the food industry, government leaders
believe that food companies will be responsible partners who will share
their knowledge to improve Americans' health. However, as some
critics urge, these beliefs may be ill-considered. One possible solution
to the conflict of interest between the food industry and public health
aims "is to call a moratorium on input from the food industry, while
offering it the chance to prove a commitment to public health."5
Yet, the same critics warn that creating "an 'invite them or fight
them' dichotomy" is a potential trap.60 According to health policy
reports, the government's achievements in food industry regulation
likely will pale in comparison to those of a motivated food industry
acting alone. 6 In 2006, a joint workshop conducted by the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Health and Human
Services ("DHHS") found that, in numerous circumstances, successful
industry self-regulation trumps government regulation by tackling
problems in a faster, more innovative, and more flexible manner.62

54. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 362.
55. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supranote 15, at 259.
56. Id. at 279; see RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 60 (providing an illustration of cereal
companies who publicly pledged to decrease marketing their unhealthy products to children, yet
continued to "aggressively" push their worst cereals towards children).
57. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 280; Michael Pollen, Rules to Eat By, N.Y.
TiMES, OCT. 11, 2009 (Magazine), at 64 ("[O]fficial government pronouncements about eating aren't
necessarily much more reliable, not when the food industry influences federal nutrition
guidelines.").
58. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 280.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 280-81.
61. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity--The New FrontierofPublic Health Law, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED 2601, 2601, 2607 (2006) (citing FTC & DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PERSPECTIVES ON

MARKETING,

SELF-REGULATION,

AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY 39 (2006),

http://www.fic.gov/os/2006/05/PerspectivesOnMarketingSelf-Regulation&ChildhoodObesityFTC
andHHSReportonJointWorkshop.pdf).
62. See FTC & DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 61, at 39. But see Sharma et
al., supra note 21, at 245 ("[A]llowing an industry to self-regulate without input from government,
consumers, or public health advocates can have serious consequences.").
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The joint workshop suggested that food companies use labeling
initiatives by incorporating nutritious seals to help customers easily
recognize healthier products.6 3 Arguably, the industry followed this
suggestion in its sponsorship of Smart Choices.6' Thus, in theory, selfregulation may offer more innovative solutions and proclaim the
industry's good intentions,65 but in practice, the Smart Choices fallout
acts as a perfect example of the failure of industry self-regulation.66
Whether inviting the food industry's involvement or fighting it,
each approach has drawbacks, "so it is important to not push the debate
in a way that the food industry must be declared either benevolent or
evil."6 On the one hand, inviting food industry involvement and blindly
trusting it can be a trap, because the industry's priorities are not always
congruent with public health goals.68 As a study on industry selfregulation noted: "Where industry and public health objectives conflict,
an industry has incentives to create a public image of concern and to
promise change, but then to create weak standards with lax
enforcement." 69 Conversely, an absolute prohibition on the food
industry's participation destroys the possibility of effective collaboration
on shared goals.70
While this Note will not go as far as to call the food industry
"evil," 7 1 it will show that the food industry has failed to self-regulate.
Particularly, the industry has pressured the government to amend
labeling laws to the detriment of public health.72 Thus, the government

63. See FTC & DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 61, at 52.
64. See Sharma et al., supra note 21, at 242.
65. See FTC & DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 61, at 52; CBS Evening
News: Food Feud, supra note 28 (showing the Chairman of Smart Choices defending the program
and claiming that it will improve Americans' eating habits and nutritional choices); see also Sharma
et al., supra note 21, at 243 ("Self-regulatory actions can be undertaken to lower the threat of
negative outcomes and to build trust.").
66. See generally Ruiz, supra note 25 (detailing the financial figures of the industry's
involvement in the creation of Smart Choices and reporting that Smart Choices' developers did not
believe there was any conflict of interest regarding the nutritional criteria); FOODUCATE BLOG,
supra note 29 (describing six reasons the Smart Choices Program fails to help shoppers, including
its low standards for nutritional criteria).
67. BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 280-81.
68. See id. at 280.
69. Sharma et al., supra note 21, at 245. The study noted that purported self-regulation efforts
by the tobacco and alcohol industries actually increased public health problems. See id.
70. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 280-81.
71. See supratext accompanying note 67.
72. See BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 15, at 279-81; Margaret Sova McCabe, Loco
Labels and Marketing Madness: Improving How Consumers InterpretInformation in the American
Food Economy, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 493,499-500 (2009).
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should impose a "moratorium"n73 and act independently from the
industry when developing the uniform FOP labeling requirements.

III.

ALPHABET Soup: THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
NUTRITION LABELING

In order to understand the food industry's influence on nutrition
policy, one must first grasp the current legal framework of nutrition
labeling. Section A of this Part will discuss the FDA's power over all
aspects of food labeling. Section B will then explore the impact of the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 ("NLEA"), especially as
it pertains to health claims made about the nutritional content of
different packaged foods. Section C will show the influence of the food
industry on nutritional labeling and exemplify how the industry trumped
strict scientific regulations through the passage of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA"). Then, Section
D will describe a further food industry victory by exploring the effect of
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act ("DSHEA"), which
allowed companies to make claims about how the nutritional aspects of
products benefited the structure or function of the human body. Finally,
Section E will explore the FTC's overlapping jurisdiction over food
advertising, and show how the food industry has taken advantage of the
FTC's more lenient approach to nutritional claims.
A. The FDA's Reign
The FDA governs all aspects of food labeling.74 Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), the FDA has statutory
authority to protect the public health by ensuring the proper labeling of
all foods.7 This is a broad power, as the FFDCA classifies "labeling" as
"all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any
article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such

73. See supra text accompanying note 59.
74. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(A) (2006); Steve Keane, Can a Consumer's Right to Know
Survive the WTO?: The Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 291, 294
(2006) ("[T]he FDA is charged with 'developing policy, regulations, guidance documents, and
enforcement strategies governing all aspects of food labeling."' (citation omitted)).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(A); see NESTLE, supra note 19, at 227 ("The FDA's mandate is to
promote safety: its job is to ensure that conventional foods ... are safe and labeled
accurately. . . .").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss4/6

12

Manning: The Skinny on the FOP Flop: Why the FDA Must Tighten the Belt on

2010]

WHY THE FDA MUST TIGHTEN THE BELT ON FOP LABELING

1239

article."76 The FFDCA further defines "label" as "a display of written,
printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any
article." 7 7 Thus, the FDA has authority to regulate any advertising on
food packaging.
B.

The NLEA and the Battle Over Health Claims: Industry Conquers
Science

In an attempt to enhance Americans' dietary behavior through
strong regulation of food labels, Congress amended the FFDCA by
passing the NLEA.80 The nutrition labeling requirements became
effective in 1994, increasing both the availability of vital nutritional
information and the understanding of the importance of a good diet.8
Furthermore, by creating a "new 'carrot-and-stick' regulatory incentive
structure," the NLEA encouraged food manufacturers to produce and
market healthier food.82 For instance, one "carrot" incentive regulated
labels by creating uniform criteria for FDA-sanctioned, promotional
claims that marketed healthy nutritional levels and disease prevention
advantages. 83 Conversely, a "stick" incentive urged manufacturers to cut
unhealthy nutrient levels in foods, by creating uniform nutrition labeling
standards that forced manufacturers to reveal unhealthy nutritional
information about products rather than only promoting healthy
information.84
The NLEA's primary purpose was to control the content and format
of food labels.8 ' However, prior to its enactment, food manufacturers
strongly lobbied for permission to notify consumers about their
products' health benefits and to make "health claims."8 Congress

76. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m); see Stephen H. McNamara, So You Want to Market a Food and to
Make Health-Related Claims-How Far Can You Go? What Rules of Law Will Govern the Claims
You Want to Make?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 421, 422 (1998).
77. 21 U.S.C. §321(k); see McNamara,supra note 76, at 422.
78. See Lisa M. Fealk-Stickler, Comment, Regulating the Regulators: The Impact of FDA
Regulation on Corporations' First Amendment Rights, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 95, 104 (2005);
McNamara, supra note 76, at 422.
79. Fealk-Stickler, supra note 78, at 98-99.
80. Sarah Taylor Roller et al., Obesity, Food Marketing and Consumer Litigation: Threat or
Opportunity?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 419, 421-22 (2006).
81. See Keane, supranote 74, at 298.
82. Roller et al., supra note 80, at 422.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id.
85. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 250; Roller et al., supranote 80, at 422.
86. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 343.
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acquiesced, 87 and thus the NLEA also established national uniform
regulations for nutrient content and health claims.8 8
Health claims assert the link between a nutrient and a "disease or
health-related condition." 89 For example, the FDA allows fibercontaining fruits, vegetables, and grain products to claim a reduced risk
of cancer and coronary heart disease. 90 Thus, one permissible health
claim appeared on an old Post Raisin Bran box, which displayed a big
red heart behind a large spoonful of cereal, while boasting: "May help
reduce the risk of heart disease because it is rich in fiber." 91 However,
less obvious on the box was a subtle limiting statement required by the
FDA, explaining that "[d]iets rich in fiber-containing grain products,
fruits and vegetables and low in saturated fat and cholesterol may reduce
your risk of heart disease, a disease associated with many factors." 92 In
her book What to Eat, Marion Nestle translated this health claim: "[T]his
cereal helps prevent disease if you eat a good diet anyway."9 3 Thus,
nutritionists remain skeptical of health claims, asserting that the main
reason behind health claims is to sell products. 94 As one commentator
noted, the NLEA is one of the federal government's "'tragedies' in its
attempt to educate consumers:
While the FDA claims that [health claims] allow[] consumers to make
informed, intelligent choices, the reality is quite the opposite, a largescale scam that allows packagers of processed foods to toss, say, a
little calcium or soy in with their largely nonnutritive foods and claim
that these foods "have the potential to prevent osteoporosis" or "reduce
the risk of heart disease." 9

87. See id
88. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 250; Roller et al., supranote 80, at 422.
89. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1) (2010); see BITTMAN, supra note 14, at 53; Martin Hahn,
FunctionalFoods: What are They? How are They Regulated? What Claims Can Be Made?, 31 AM.
J.L. & MED. 305, 318 (2005) (showing examples of FDA-approved health claims, including
"'calcium and osteoporosis, "'dietary lipids and cancer,"' and 'sodium and hypertension"'
(footnotes omitted)); Ilene Ringel Heller, Functional Foods: Regulatory and Marketing
Developments, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 197, 200 (2001).
90. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 257 tbl.31 (showing FDA-approved health claims) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. NESTLE, supranote 45, at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See BIrrMAN, supra note 14, at 54; NESTLE, supra note 45, at 342-43. As Nestle noted:
"[T]he Big Four Cereal companies are paying well over $2 billion a year to get you to buy breakfast
cereals. The absurdity of this expense ... explains much of the absurdity of health claims on cereal
boxes." See id at 339.
95. BITEMAN, supranote 14, at 53.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss4/6

14

Manning: The Skinny on the FOP Flop: Why the FDA Must Tighten the Belt on

2010]1

WHY THE FDA MUST TIGHTEN THE BELT ON FOP LABELING

1241

The NLEA sets forth the procedure for FDA pre-approval of health
claims for food products. 96 Initially, the claims were subject to strict
FDA scrutiny. 97 Before the enactment of the NLEA, the FDA prohibited
health claims on all food packages, because it equated such statements to
claims about the benefits of pharmaceutical drugs. 9 8 Once health claims
were permitted for conventional foods, manufacturers had to meet a
rigid standard of scientific proof to obtain FDA approval.99 The FDA
only authorized health claims that were "supported by (1) published
scientific evidence from (2) well-designed studies (3) conducted
according to standard scientific procedures, evaluated with (4)
significant agreement among (5) qualified experts." 100 Thus, just as the
FDA required pharmaceutical companies to support claims that their
drugs could reduce cholesterol levels, food companies were also forced
to back their health claims with scientific studies.' 0 '
Moreover, the FDA prohibited food manufacturers from freely
using the word "healthy." 0 2 Under a prior loophole, food companies
could assert that jelly beans were good for you because they contain
nearly no fat or salt.10 3 The FDA plugged this loophole by excluding
health claims about junk food under the "jelly bean rule." 0 4 The jelly
bean rule prevents health claims on foods with "[d]isqualifying nutrient
levels." 05 Thus, it restricts the use of the word "healthy" to foods "low
in fat and saturated fat, limited in sodium and cholesterol, and containing
at least 10% of the recommended amount of at least one key nutrient:
vitamin A, vitamin C, iron, calcium, protein, or fiber." 0 6 The FDA also

96. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (2010); Hahn, supra note 89, at 318; Dana Ziker, Biotechnology:
Regulating Functional Foods: Pre- and Post-Market Strategy, 2002 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 24,
118, http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0024.html.
97. See Hahn, supra note 89, at 318; McNamara, supra note 76, at 422; Ziker, supra note 96,
at 18.
98. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 343.
99. Ziker, supra note 96, at 18.
100. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 256.
101. NESTLE, supra note 45, at 343.
102. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 256.
103. See id.
104. See id; Heller, supra note 89, at 201; Ziker, supra note 96, at 1 18.
105. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(4) (2010); see Heller, supra note 89, at 201, Ziker, supra note 96, at
18.
106. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 256; see 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(4); Hahn, supra note 89, at 319
("The disqualifying levels for fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, and sodium are 13 grams, 4 grams, 60
milligrams, and 480 milligrams, respectively."); Heller, supra note 89, at 201; Ziker, supra note 96,
at 1I8.
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created a policy to prohibit manufacturers from fortifying foods for no
other reason than meeting the definition of "healthy."107
C.

The Food Industry Prevails-TheEffects of the FDAMA

Congress passed the FDAMA due to the strong industry lobbying
efforts of dietary supplement manufacturers. os However, the savvy food
industry rode the coattails of this major victory and used the FDAMA to
its advantage.' 09 The FDAMA loosened the regulations for health claims
by providing an exception to the FDA pre-approval requirement." 0
Claims do not need pre-approval if they are "substantiated by an
'authoritative statement' published by 'a scientific body of the
Government with official responsibility for public health protection or
research directly relating to human nutrition."'" Under the FDAMA,
manufacturers can alert the FDA that they plan to introduce a health
claim supported by an authoritative statement from a single federal
scientific body, without proving widespread scientific agreement.112
Thus, although this rule appears stringent, it is a less severe standard
than "'significant scientific agreement.""' 3

107. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 256. Fortification of foods originated when scientists
sought techniques to cure common nutrient deficiencies in the general population's diet. See id at
301. The practice blossomed in the late 1970s, as better technology made it easy for manufacturers
to increase the vitamin and nutrient content of their products, and the marketplace showed a higher
demand for healthy food. See id. at 304-05. While fortifying foods may benefit some aspects of
one's health, most of its advantages are uncertain. See id. at 296. For example, it is unlikely that
improvements in health will result from the growing trend of adding vitamins and minerals to
products that run the gamut from candy to water to cereal. See id. In fact, such practice "raises
concerns about the possible hazards of too much of a good thing." Id.
108. See James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriberand Marketer
Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 295, 297
(2003).
109. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 344 (noting that courts usually ruled in favor of companies
on First Amendment grounds when those companies sued the FDA for denying petitions for health
claims).
I 10. See McNamara, supra note 76, at 422-23; Ziker, supra note 96, at 1 18.
Ill. See Ziker, supra note 96, at 18 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(G)(i) (2000)). An
example of an FDA-authorized health claim for calcium is, "' [r]egular exercise and a healthy diet
with enough calcium helps teens and young white and Asian women maintain good bone health and
may reduce their risk of osteoporosis."' Id. (quoting Heller, supra note 89, app. at 221); see
McNamara, supranote 76, at 423-24.
112. See NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 124
(2009).
113. NESTLE, supranote 45, at 344. But see FORTIN, supra note 112, at 124-25 (explaining that
in practice, the different standards did not have a large impact on the approval of health claims).
Although the FDAMA offered a technical change to hasten review of health claims, by giving the
FDA a 120-day deadline for evaluating suggested new health claims, this expedited review
frequently resulted in rejection. See id.
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After the enactment of the FDAMA, dietary supplement companies
sued the FDA almost every time it denied their petitions for health
claims.114 The industry often prevailed in these cases because courts
held that the companies were exercising their First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech." 5 The landmark case granting companies this right
was Pearson v. Shalala,"6 the "industry's most impressive court
victory."' 17
In Pearson, dietary supplement manufacturers sued the government
after the FDA rejected four separate health claims about their
products.8 Although supported by evidence, the claims failed to
comply with the FDA's "significant scientific agreement"
requirement.H"9 The court rebuked the FDA, calling the requirement
"almost frivolous." 20 As interpreted by the court, the FDA's stance was
that "health claims lacking 'significant scientific agreement' are
inherently misleading because they. . . make it virtually impossible for
[consumers] to exercise any judgment at the point ofsale."l 2 ' The court
criticized this argument, claiming "[i]t would be as if the consumers
were asked to buy something while hypnotized, and therefore they are
bound to be misled." 22 Thus, the court rejected the FDA's argument
that health claims could mislead consumers, dismissing it as an unsound,
"simplistic view of human nature or market behavior." 23
Ultimately, the court held that if the FDA could require disclaimers
on labels to satisfy its scientific substantiation objectives, it could not
prohibit health claims.1 24 Later cases reflected this freedom of speech
trend. As one court held: "[T]he complete ban of a claim would be
approved only under narrow circumstances-where there was little-tono scientific evidence in support of the claim and where the government
could prove that the public would still be deceived by the claim even
with the use of accompanying disclaimers." 2 5 Thus, Pearsonopened the
field for more flexible rules on health claims for supplements, and
114. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 344.
115. See id.
116. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
117. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 265-66.
118. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 651-53.
119. See id. at 653-54; Ziker, supra note 96, at $ 21.
120. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655; see NESTLE, supra note 19, at 266.
121. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655.
122. Id. The thrust of this holding was re-emphasized in another case three years later, where
the court held that the First Amendment represents a "clear preference for disclosure over
suppression of commercial speech." Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2002).
123. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656; see NESTLE, supra note 19, at 266.
124. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 658-59; Ziker, supra note 96, at $ 21.
125. Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
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pushed conventional food-manufacturers to claim, obstinately, that they
deserved the exact same First Amendment rights.1 26 As a result, the food
industry compelled the FDA to compromise its science-based method.12 7
This decision and its consequences irked nutritionists like Nestle:
Any sensible person might think that the Founding Fathers devised the
First Amendment to protect political dissent rather than the right of
food marketers to use overblown health claims on cereal boxes. But
that is how the courts interpret this constitutional amendment, and the
FDA chose not to press alternative legal arguments.128
The courts' overly indulgent application of the First Amendment,
when it comes to the obesity crisis, is particularly troublesome. The
FDA's lowered standard for health claims allows the industry more
creativity in its use of nutrition claims.129 Nutritionists find this
alarming, as "[a] health claim on a food product is a good indication that
it's not really food." 30
Although Smart Choices did not utilize health claims per se, the
program illustrates the danger inherent in this creative freedom.' 3 ' For
example, apart from endorsing sugary cereals, Smart Choices promoted
as healthy: Breyers' ice cream, both regular and light Hellmann's Real
Mayonnaise, and Kid Cuisine's Magical Cheese Stuffed Crust Pizza
(containing twenty-three percent of a person's recommended daily
saturated fat intake). 3 2 These claims can confuse consumers and lead to
poor nutrition. 1 In announcing his investigation of Smart Choices,
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal warned: "'At a time
when healthcare efforts rightly focus on prevention of obesity and
labels may derail, destroy and delay
malnutrition, false and misleading
34
goals."'l
national
laudable
such
However, according to the Pearson precedent, the industry prevails
on this argument. As the court held in the landmark decision, the FDA's
argument that health claims lacking significant scientific agreement
126. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 266.
127. See id. at 267.
128. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 344.
129. See id.
130. BITTMAN, supra note 14, at 54 (quoting nutritionist Michael Pollan).
131. See Wanjek, supra note 30 ("[A]ny consumer relying solely on Smart Choices
checkmarks will surely be diabetic, obese or even dead within a few years.").
132. See Ruiz, supra note 25; Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Investigates
"Sman Choices" Food Labels that Endorse Mayonnaise and Sugary Cereals (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?A=3673&Q=448878.
133.

See Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen., supra note 132 (quoting Connecticut Attorney

General Richard Blumenthal).
134. Id. ("Meaningful nutritional information is welcome, but not faux food facts.").
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could mislead consumers was "simplistic" and nearly "frivolous."' 3 5
This Note contends that the burgeoning obesity crisis warrants the
FDA's "simplistic" view. 1 36 The industry's success in pushing the
FDAMA and lowering the bar for health claims is further proof that it
should not be trusted to self-regulate.
D. IndustryAdds Another Cherry on Top-the DSHEA and
Structure/FunctionClaims
Notwithstanding the lowered bar for health claims, the FDA
provides even more leniency for "structure/function claims." 1 7 In fact,
to dodge FDA requirements, some food manufacturers started using
structure/function claims rather than health claims.' 38 Structure/function
claims stem from the nutritional value of a product, and state how the
"product affects the structure or function of the body." 1 3 9 Thus, a
company can assert that "calcium builds strong bones" or "fiber
maintains bowel regularity," if it guarantees the truth of the claim.14 0
Moreover, the FDA does not pre-approve these claims. 141 The FDA only
misleading, [and]
requires that these claims be "'[t]ruthful, not
1 42
substantiated"' by "'scientifically valid evidence."'
The food industry can again thank the dietary supplement industry
for these relaxed regulations, as strong lobbying efforts by the latter
allowed for looser structure/function requirements.1 43 In response to the
135. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999); NESTLE, supranote 19, at
266.
136. See Pearson,164 F.3d at 656.
137. See Heller, supra note 89, at 206 ("Much controversy has arisen over the fine line
separating structure/function claims, which do not require FDA premarket approval, from health
claims, which do require such approval.").
138. See id.
139. Ziker, supranote 96, at 19.
140. See Sarah Skidmore, Kellogg Pulls Immunity Claims from Rice Krispies, FOOD
MANUFACTURING (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.foodmanufacturing.com/scripts/ShowPR-RID13170-wnnvz-clpb87tV1KLyVm9b.asp.
141. See id.
142. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 228 tbl.27 (comparing the policies of the FDA and FTC on
health claims and structure/function claims); Marion Nestle, Kellogg's Withdraws Immunity Claim!,
FOOD POLMCS (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.foodpolitics.com/2009/11/kelloggs-withdrawsimmunity-claim/. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(f) (2010) (outlining the requirements for
permitted structure/function statements).
143. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 262-63; Hahn, supra note 89, at 323. According to Nestle,
the dietary supplement industry employed scare-tactics to achieve its success with the DSHEA:
The New York Times called DSHEA a "retreat for the FDA" and noted how few issues
during that congressional session "generated as much grass-roots emotion, largely
because the supplement industry waged a well-financed scare campaign that had many
health-minded Americans convinced, wrongly, that the [FDA] was about to ban these
popular products."
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lobbying, Congress amended the FFDCA in 1994 by enacting the
DSHEA.1 44 The DSHEA limited the FDA's power over dietary
supplements. 145 Combined with pressure from Congress, the DSHEA
effectively forced the FDA to loosen its regulations and to permit
statements of nutritional support for dietary supplements.1 4 6
The FDA recognized the inherent double standard, and then
similarly liberalized regulations for foods to avoid the contradiction
presented by dietary supplements.1 4 7 The agency understood that it could
not allow claims on dietary supplements to explain the value of an
ingredient and its effect on the structure or function of the body, while
still confining the use of structure/function claims for conventional
foods.148 Moreover, food companies also noticed the double standard,
and protested that they should be able to make the same type of claims
as dietary supplement manufacturers.1 4 9
Initially, the FDA sent warning letters to companies using
structure/function claims, but it eventually quit after Pearson and other
freedom of speech victories for the food industry.150 The FDA now
permits structure/function claims if they are "truthful and not
creative use of
misleading."' 5 ' Given food manufacturers'
structure/function claims, "[m]isleading, of course, is in the eye of the

beholder."l

52

E. The FTC's Supplemental JurisdictionFurtherMuddies the Waters
In addition to the FDA's over-arching power, the FTC also has
statutory authority to regulate food advertising. ' Thus, the two
agencies often share overlapping responsibilities, and there is a slim
NESTLE, supra note 19, at 262-63.
144. See Barbara A. Noah, Foreword: Dietary Supplement Regulation in Flux, 31 AM. J.L. &
MED. 147, 147-48 (2005); Hahn, supra note 89, at 315.
145. Hahn, supra note 89, at 323.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Nestle, supra note 142.
150. Id. See generally Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that even if
health claims lacked significant scientific agreement, the First Amendment still protected them
because they were not misleading enough to warrant an outright ban); Whitaker v. Thompson, 248
F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that suppressing health claims, rather than using disclaimers,
was unconstitutional because the claims were not inherently misleading).
151. Nestle, supranote 142.
152. Id.
153. See Keane, supra note 74, at 294 (describing how the FDA has primary responsibility for
food labeling, but "[o]ther federal agencies have supplemental jurisdiction"); McNamara, supra
note 76, at 422 (claiming that the FTC governs "claims used in television, radio, magazine,
newspaper or other 'advertising"').
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margin between their levels of authority.15 4 The fine line between the
FDA and the FTC causes a regulatory headache due to the different rules
created by the different agencies for labels versus advertisements.155
Thus, the authorization of health claims for foods and supplements
"becomes exceptionally messy." 56
Despite the narrow difference in their powers, FTC policies are
much more relaxed than those of the FDA.157 The FTC does not
differentiate health claims from nutritional support assertions, does not
force companies to get authorization for health claims before using them
in marketing, and has lower standards for support of these claims.5 8
Thus, overall, the FTC will authorize advertisements proclaiming health
benefits about products that the FDA will not allow on product labels.15 9
In his announcement of the creation of the FDA Obesity Working
Group, the chairman of the FTC stated that both agencies should "further
the free flow of truthful and non-misleading information about the
nutritional profile and health effects of foods" because "[flood labeling
and advertising can be critical channels to provide consumers with the
information to make better food choices."160
Furthermore,
"[c]ompetition about the health effects of food also can provide a
powerful economic incentive for companies to develop and market
healthier foods, including foods with fewer calories."' 6 '

154. See Fealk-Stickler,supra note 78, at 103-04.
155. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 227; James M. Serafino, Developing Standardsfor Health
Claims-the FDA and the FTC, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 335, 350-53 (1992).
156. NESTLE, supranote 19, at 227.
157. See id. at 226-29.
158. See id. at 227.
159. See id. at 229-30. Nestle further elaborated on the different powers of the FDA and the
FTC:
In advertisements ... marketers are permitted to make much more blatant statements
about health benefits, just as long as they can produce a supporting study if anyone asks
for it. The books in health food stores are protected by First Amendment rights to free
speech, and DSHEA explicitly prohibits the FDA from considering books, pamphlets,
and fliers distributed at the point of sale as "labeling."
Id. at 230; see McNamara, supra note 76, at 435 ("[T]here is no requirement for FTC preclearance
of health claims used in advertising, and [a] company would be free to use [a] claim in
advertising ... even though the claim could not properly be used in labeling without first complying
with [FFDCA] health claim requirements.").
160. Press Release, Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Announcement of FDA Obesity
Working Group Report (Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/040312fdaobesity
rpt.pdf. After the DHHS's Roundtable on Obesity and Nutrition in July 2003, the FDA established
its Obesity Working Group to create an action plan outlining the FDA's standpoint on the obesity
crisis. See Questions and Answers-the FDA's Obesity Working Group Report, FDA (June 2, 2006),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/ucm082094.htm.
161. Press Release, Timothy J. Muris, supra note 160.
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This "powerful economic incentive" backfired on the food
industry-Exhibit A is the collapse of Smart Choices. It will continue to
boomerang unless the FDA strengthens regulations. Thus, it is even
more crucial that the FDA act independently in its creation of FOP
uniform guidelines, so that consumers who are misled by media
advertisements will not be further confronted in supermarkets by bogus
health and structure/function claims. 62
IV.

MISLEADING: THE FOOD INDUSTRY'S MIDDLE NAME

According to the FFDCA, a food product classifies as misbranded
if its label is false or misleading in any particular way.' 63 This provision
is especially pertinent given the increased use of health and
structure/function claims attributable to the advent of functional
foods.164 Functional foods have health advantages that extend beyond
their typical nutrient levels, as manufacturers intentionally add
ingredients so that the foods will qualify for FDA-sanctioned health
claims. 165 Questionable research, paired with eager advertising claims
about functional foods, often leads to consumer confusion.' 66 The food
industry exacerbates this confusion, because manufacturers can market a
product as healthy regardless of whether it nearly exceeds the nutrient
level or it just barely contains a nutrient.167 Because consumers face "a
barrage of conflicting studies about the link between diet and

162. See MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER'S MANIFESTO 39-40 (2008).

Pollan describes the dangers of promoting packaged foods over natural fruits and vegetables:
[A]s a general rule it's a whole lot easier to slap a health claim on a box of sugary cereal
than on a raw potato or a carrot, with the perverse result that the most healthful foods in
the supermarket sit there quietly in the produce section, silent as stroke victims, while a
few aisles over in Cereal the Cocoa Puffs and Lucky Charms are screaming their
newfound "whole-grain goodness" to the rafters.
Watch out for those health claims.
Id.
163. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2006) (defining "[fialse or misleading label").
164. See Rebecca Ruiz, Eight Puzzling Food Labels, FORBES.COM (Sept. 23, 2009, 4:15 PM
EDT), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/23/food-labels-healthy-lifestyle-health-smart-choices-nutrition.
html.
165. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 104. Among the extra ingredients that food manufacturers
use to doctor functional foods are "oils, artificial sweeteners, indigestible starches, cholesterol
reducers, soy or milk (whey) proteins, phytochemicals, and other such things." See id. at 478. For
example, some yogurt manufacturers infuse their products with bacteria intended to combat
constipation. See id. at 104-05; Artificial Success: The Fadfor FunctionalFoods, ECONOMIST, Sept.
26, 2009, at 81 (singling out Dannon's Activia brand).
166. See Ruiz, supra note 164 (explaining that although scientific research hints at how to
attain the best health, scientists still don't understand how the body optimally absorbs particular
nutrients).
167. See id.
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health,... it should come as no shock that [the food industry]. . . has
promoted confusion in the media and in the mind of the American
consumer to contribute to our culture of overconsumption."168
The food industry capitalizes on this confusion and the consumers'
desire for healthier food.169 The American market for functional foods
and beverages totaled more than $30 billion in 2008.170 Moreover,
economists expect the global market for functional foods to swell from
$78 billion in 2007 to $128 billion in 2013.'1' The Smart Choices
campaign is just one example of the burgeoning functional foods
industry and its potential to mislead consumers. 17 2
The breakfast cereal market provides an even better illustration of
the dangers inherent in the industry's infatuation with functional
foods.173 Kellogg's recent advertising blunders epitomize these
dangers.1 74 First, in early 2009, Kellogg claimed that "clinical" studies
showed that its Frosted Mini-Wheats cereal improves a child's attention

168. BITTMAN, supra note 14, at 54.
169. See id. at 55. Bittman compares the science of "nutritionism" to physics, asserting that
research is often disputed and frequently replaced by newer findings. See id. He asserts that while
money is at stake in physics, it is "usually small potatoes-not a lot of people read about or make
money on muons-compared with what's at stake in 'discovering' a 'new' nutrient that can be
marketed to the American public as The Next Big Thing." Id.
170. See Ruiz, supra note 164.
171. See ArtificialSuccess: The Fadfor FunctionalFoods, supra note 165, at 81.
172. See id.; see also supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (criticizing the misleading
nature of Smart Choices).
173. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 308-10 (describing Kellogg's and General Mills'
campaigns to convince the public that their products are essential to a healthy breakfast and to sell
more cereal by advertising new fortified ingredients).
174. See generally Bruce Horovitz, Kellogg Pulls Immunity Claim from Rice Krispies, USA
TODAY (Nov. 6, 2009, 10:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2009-11-04kellogg-immunity_.N.htm (explaining the controversy where Kellogg claimed its Rice Krispies
supported children's immunity); Ruiz, supra note 164 (reporting on the disciplinary action the FTC
took after Kellogg made one of its controversial claims); The Today Show: A Box a Day? Critics
Blast Cereal Immunity Claims (NBC television broadcast Nov. 3, 2009), available at
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/26184891/vp/33599776#33599776 (criticizing Kellogg's claims as
"flimsy science").
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span by twenty percent. 1s The FTC reprimanded Kellogg, rejecting its
"unsatisfactory" study for the advertisement. 17 6 Moreover, it banned
Kellogg from making related claims about its other cereals and
snacks. 77
However, Kellogg rebounded later the same year with more
controversial claims.' 8 In late 2009, during the height of the HINI
(swine flu) pandemic, Kellogg boasted on its Cocoa Krispies and Rice
Krispies boxes that the cereals boosted immunity.179 This time, Kellogg
voluntarily withdrew its claims due to the intense criticism they
received.180 However, before Kellogg pulled the claims, the FDA
responded to criticism by claiming: "The manufacturer is responsible for
ensuring the accuracy and truthfulness of these claims; they are not pre-

175. KidsCommercialsRock, Noah Munck-Frosted Mini Wheats Commercial (2009),
YouTUBE (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-uXQKM7gxxo8. In one
commercial, a frazzled elementary school teacher, talking to herself at the beginning of class, asks
"Okay, now where were we?" Id. While most of the students appear either fidgety or bored, one
student raises his hand and launches into an explanation: "We were on the third paragraph of page
fifty-seven and you were explaining that the stone structures made by ancient Romans were called
aqueducts, and as you were writing that up on the board, your chalk broke. . .into three pieces." Id.
The stunned teacher agrees with the student, and an animated Frosted Mini-Wheat, perched on the
student's book, sheds a tear claiming, "I've never been so proud." Id.; see also Lawrence Rubin,
What do FrostedMini Wheats, Mick Jaggerand Superheroes Have in Common?, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Sept. 30, 2009, 12:16 PM), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/popular-culture-meetspsychology/200909/what-do-frosted-mini-wheats-mick-jagger-and-superheroes ("In one fell swoop,
Kelloggs [sic], by promising that their product will energize as well as enhance childrens' focus, has
laid claim to both the health-enhancing and implied medicinal value of Frosted Mini Wheats. Who
needs Adderall, Ritalin, fruit and vegetables, when a heaping bowlful of cereal will do."); Ruiz,
supra note 164 ("Earlier this year, [Kellogg] was reprimanded when it used the results of a study to
advertise Frosted Mini-Wheats cereal as 'clinically' shown to improve a child's attentiveness by
20%.").
176. See Ruiz, supra note 164. Kellogg has since "toned down" its advertisements for Frosted
Mini-Wheats, instead claiming that the cereal helps keep children "full and focused." Jennifer
LaRue Huget, Is That Right? FrostedMini-Wheats Keep Kids "Fulland Focused," THE CHECKUP
(May 29, 2009, 7:00 AM ET), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkup/2009/05/is-thatright
frosted_mini-whe.html.
177. See Ruiz, supranote 164.
178. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
179. See Horovitz, supranote 174.
180. See id. (quoting a Kellogg's representative, who said that the company pulled the claims
"given the public attention on HINI," even though "[lt was purely coincidental that this package
made it to shelves at a similar time as HINI"); see also The Today Show: A Box a Day? Critics
Blast Cereal, supra note 174 (quoting Dr. Nancy Snyderman to the effect that, "the idea that the
cereal you eat in the morning could make that big a deal for your immune system is very flimsy
science").
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approved by [the] FDA but must be truthful and not misleading.""s1 The
FDA's lack of power to address the situation makes one wonder what
the cereal makers will dream up next.
Recognizing the nutritional hot-bed of cereal claims, The Rudd
Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University (the "Rudd
Center") recently evaluated the marketing and nutritional quality of
children's cereal.182 As a result, "obesity researchers for the first time
have hard data proving that the least healthy cereals are the ones
marketed most aggressively to children."' 8 3 In examining FOP
marketing, the Rudd Center found that cereals with poor nutrition
rankings-like General Mills' Lucky Charms, Cookie Crisp, and
Reese's Puffs (bearing the worst nutrition rating)-averaged three to
four health claims per box.184 Moreover, the study discovered that the
cereals with the worst nutrition rankings still qualified for the Smart
Choices stamp and the "better-for-you" endorsement.18 5 "[B]etter-foryou" is another FOP labeling campaign, created by the Council of Better
Business Bureaus as part of its Children's Food and Beverage

181. See The Today Show: A Box a Day? Critics Blast Cereal, supra note 174. The FDA's
inaction sparked criticism, including a satirical list of the top reasons the agency permitted the
claims. See Mike Adams, Ten Reasons Why the FDA Allows Cocoa Krispies Cereal to Make
Outrageous Claims of Boosting Immunity (Satire), NATURALNEWS (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.naturalnews.com/027387 Rice_Krispiesjbreakfast-cereal.html (listing the top reason as
"nutritional health claims carry more scientific weight when they're introduced by magical singing
elves").
182. See RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 10. In 2008, the Rudd Center researched the effect of
food marketing aimed at children. See id. It conducted objective, science-based analysis of
marketing practices and nutrition-content for different food products-cereal was the first category
of foods that it examined. See id. The purpose of the study was to underscore both positive and
negative industry practices. See id. One of the dimensions of the study evaluated FOP marketing.
See id. at 23. In its inspection of FOP marketing, the Rudd Center evaluated the package for
marketing features in three categories: child engagement messages, health messages (including
health claims), and website advertising (giving the URL for the cereal). See id. at 23-24.
183. Bonnie Rochman, Sweet Spot: New Data on How the Least Healthy Cereals Do the Most
Marketing,TIME, Nov. 2, 2009, at 55, 55-56.
184. RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 58, 60, 76 tbl.9. The study used a broad definition of health
claims, incorporating both health claims and structure/function claims into one umbrella term. See
id. at 23-24. According to the Rudd Center: "Health claims describe the product's health outcome
benefits, overall healthfulness, or role in a healthy lifestyle (e.g. 'lower your cholesterol,' 'heart
healthy'). Health claims include functional benefits related to certain ingredients (i.e., health claims
regulated by the FDA) and unregulated claims that suggest health benefits." Compare id. at 24
(seemingly merging the definitions of health claims and structure/function claims), with supra notes
89-92 and accompanying text (defining health claims), and supra text accompanying note 138
(defining structure/function claims).
185. RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 11, 60.
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Advertising Initiative ("CFBAI").'8 6 Fifteen major companies
participated in the initiative, pledging to limit their marketing directed at
children and heighten their promotion of "better-for-you" foods.187
Significantly, rather than marketing the products as healthy, the food
manufacturers simply claim that the products represent choices that are
"better for you."' 8 8 This marketing strategy suggests that slight
enhancements make the products healthier, and thus improve
consumers' health. 89
Like the low nutritional benchmarks set by Smart Choices, the
"better-for-you" program also uses lax nutritional criteria.190 Because
the industry establishes the nutritional criteria for the "better-for-you"
program, most, if not all, products can receive a "better-for-you"
designation.' 9' Thus, there are significant loopholes in the food
companies' pledges.' 92 According to the Rudd Center: "When industry
is involved in developing their own nutritional standards, the resulting
standards are unacceptable to the public." 9 3
The "Guiding Stars" program highlights these loopholes in
industry-created nutritional standards. 94 In 2006, a supermarket chain
enlisted an independent panel of leaders in the nutrition field, who used
independently established standards to create a nutrition-ranking
program called Guiding Stars. 1 Guiding Stars ranks foods on a threestar scale: products marked with one star have good nutritional value,
products with two stars have better nutritional value, and products with

186. About the Initiative, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, http://www.bbb.org/us/aboutchildren-food-beverage-advertising-initiative/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). The Council of Better
Business Bureaus unveiled the CFBAI to give food and beverage companies a "transparent and
accountable advertising self-regulation mechanism." Id. The CFBAI's goal was to refocus
advertising in order to promote better health choices for children under twelve years old. See id.
187. RUDDCTR.,supra note 9, at 11.
188. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 388.
189. Id. For example, Post/Kraft enhanced Fruity Pebbles by cutting sugars from twelve to nine
grams per serving and including three grams of polydextrose fiber. Id. However, as Nestle noted: "It
remains uncertain whether artificial sweeteners and polydextrose are better for children or whether
such products produce measureable health benefits." Id.
190. RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at I1.
191. See id. The Rudd Center noted the dubious nature of the CFBAI: "The question is whether
industry's self-regulatory efforts such as the CFBAI are good faith efforts to create real change or a
public relations tool meant to offset criticism and forestall government action." Id. at 57.
192. See id. at 11-12.
193. Id. at 61.
194. NESTLE, supra note 19, at 389 (describing the program created by the northeastern
supermarket chain, Hannaford).
195. See id.; Scientific Advisory Panel, GUIDING STARS, http://www.guidingstars.com/advisors
/scientific-advisory-panell (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (showcasing the members of the Scientific
Advisory Panel that created Guiding Stars, including doctors, scientists, professors, and dieticians).
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three stars have the best nutritional value. 19 6 Significantly, based on the
Guiding Stars' nutritional criteria, more than three-quarters of the
supermarket's 27,000 products failed to qualify for even one star. 197
Moreover, almost all of the food industry's self-endorsed products were
ineligible for any stars.19 8
Even seemingly independent organizations succumb to the
powerful food industry. The industry sponsors both the American Heart
Association ("AHA") and the American Diabetes Association ("ADA"),
and in turn, these organizations endorse questionable food products.'99
The AHA allows its "food criteria" claim on many General Mills
cereals, including "such sugary treats as Lucky Charms, Count Chocula,
and Cocoa Puffs." 200 Like all cereals, these brands derive from plant
seeds, and thus are low in saturated fat and cholesterol. 201 However, they
also contain high levels of calories and sugars. Connecting the dots to
highlight the campaign's irony, Nestle observed: "Sugars have calories.
Calories contribute to weight gain. Obesity is a factor for heart
disease." 202
Equally conspicuous, obesity is a factor in diabetes.203 Despite this,
the ADA sponsored Post's Honey Nut and Frosted Shredded Wheat
Cereals. 2 04 Significantly, Kraft Foods, the parent company of Post
cereals, donated at least $500,000 to the ADA in 2004.205 Nestle again
emphasized this irony:
After hearing me speak about this sponsorship arrangement with
Post cereals, Jane Brody, who has long reported for The New York
Times Science Section, wrote in September 2004 that the [ADA]
seemed like a "surprising bedfellow for a sweetened cereal, even one
made from whole grain." The association, she said, told her it had
changed its policy and would "no longer automatically permit such

196. See About: Guiding Stars, GUIDING STARS, http://www.guidingstars.com/what-is-guidingstars/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (describing the Guiding Stars program).
197. See NESTLE, supra note 19, at 389.
198. See id. ("By independent criteria, junk foods are not health foods.").
199. See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
200. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 351.
201. Id.
202. Id. According to Nestle, the AHA "is doing important work to promote heart health, and I
find it depressing that arrangements with food companies are not more transparent." Id. at 353; see
Ruiz, supra note 164 (reporting that the AHA approves General Mills' Oatmeal Crisp Crunchy
Almond cereal as a "heart-healthy" product, and "[tihough it contains whole-grain oats and wholegrain wheat, it also has two types of sugar as some of it highest ingredients and, in addition, has
added corn syrup and honey").
203. See What is Obesity, supra note 2.
204. See NESTLE, supra note 45, at 354-55.
205. See id. at 355.
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statements from companies that contribute to it." Perhaps, but more
than a year later I was still finding the acknowledgment of Post's
sponsorship of the [ADA] on new boxes of Honey Nut and Frosted
Shredded Wheat cereals. 206
Food manufacturers often escape such scrutiny, because the FDA
does not require manufacturers to show the added sugar content on
packages, which illustrates "yet another instance of how slowly evolving
guidelines can create a gray area in food manufacturing and
marketing." 207 The food companies' sponsorship of health organizations
shows the "inherent psychological deception and predatory marketing
practices of the American food industry." 208 Moreover, they exemplify
why the FDA should act independently when creating uniform FOP
labeling regulations.
V. THE FDA MUST ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT, UNIFORM FOP
LABELING SCHEME TO LIMIT CONSUMER CONFUSION
Clearly, the FDA needs to strengthen national food labeling
regulations.209 Without strong government regulation, consumers cannot
trust the food industry to adopt reliable FOP labeling. 210 A recent
European study found the proof in the proverbial pudding when it
measured consumers' understanding of FOP labels, together with the
effect that the labels had in encouraging consumers to make healthier
choices. 2 1' The study urged the adoption of a uniform FOP labeling
format, concluding that too many different FOP labeling formats cause

206. Id.
207. Ruiz, supra note 164 ("Such blind spots in nutrition can open the door for misleading
health claims, which can then leave consumers feeling overwhelmed.").
208. Rubin, supra note 175. Rubin compared the cereal advertising to marketing for
psychotropic and erectile dysfunction drugs, equating consumers' desires for these medicinal
benefits to parents' desires for "miracle substance[s]" for their children. See id. The comparison led
Rubin to ponder: "But what's next, a Black Box Warning on Cocoa Puffs, a voice-over shooting
machine gun disqualifiers on Captain Crunch commercials, or perhaps small print on cereal boxes
saying something like "if signs of increased focus last for more than four hours, please contact your
child's pediatrician?" See id.
209. See Neal, supra note 41, at 121 ("More national regulation of food manufacturers is
needed to eliminate the problems associated with unclear food labeling and hidden ingredients.").
210. See Gerda I.J. Feunekes et al., Front-of-Pack Nutrition Labelling: Testing Effectiveness of
Different Nutrition Labelling Formats Front-of-Packin Four European Countries, 50 APPETITE 57,
69 (2008), http://www.trace.eu.orgadmin/news/file/ArticleAppetite.pdf, see also supra Parts IIIIV (discussing how food industry and third party FOP labeling is misleading).
211. See generally Feunekes et al., supra note 210 (evaluating consumer data from four
different European countries-the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlandsmeasuring the consumers' opinions of the different FOP labeling schemes used by various
products).
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consumer confusion, and thus reduce the effectiveness of all FOP
labeling formats. 212
It is essential that the American food market take note of the
European study's conclusion, as consumer confusion continues to mount
due to the more than half-dozen health labels crowding packages. 213 The
FDA has already recognized the need for action.2 14 As FDA
Commissioner Hamburg noted in October 2009: "'There's a growing
proliferation of forms and symbols, check marks, numerical ratings,
stars, heart icons and the like ....

There's truly a cacophony of

2 15
approaches, not unlike the tower of Babel."'
Interestingly, this was not the first time that Hamburg compared
food packaging to the Tower of Babel.2 16 A month before her remarks
on FOP labeling, Hamburg addressed the obesity crisis and emphasized
the importance of food labeling as a crucial way of educating consumers
about nutrition.217 She stressed that food labeling is "critical for the
health and vitality of our nation," but acknowledged that the issue had
not been properly in focus since the 1990 enactment of the NLEA.2 18
According to Hamburg:

Back then, the FDA labeling rules addressed a "Tower of Babel" on
food packages proclaiming nutritional and sometimes specific diseaserelated health benefits that were either unfounded or misleading.
Recently, however, we've seen the emergence of claims that may
not provide the full picture of their products' true nutritional value. It
will be important to re-establish a science-based approach to protect
the public.

212. Id. at 69.
213. See FDA Cracks Down on Deceptive FoodLabels, supra note 35 (citing as examples the
AHA's "heart-shaped logo, Giant Food Store's Healthy Ideas box and Supervalu's Nutritional IQ
logo").
214. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
215. FDA Cracks Down on Deceptive Food Labels, supra note 35 (quoting FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg); see Genesis 11:1-9 (King James). According to the biblical
story of the Tower of Babel, God was angered at the men who dared to erect a tower "whose top
may reach unto heaven" to make a name for themselves, rather than to worship God. Id. 11:4. As a
punishment, God confused their language so "that they [could] not understand one another's
speech" and scattered the people all over the earth. Id. 11:4-9.
216. See Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, FDA, Keynote Address at the National Food Policy
Conference (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucml82061.htm [hereinafter
Hamburg, Keynote Address].
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 6

1256

HOFS TRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 38:1227

Smart Choices tried to simplify the "Tower of Babel" 22 0 syndrome
by creating a uniform FOP labeling system, but its plan backfired.2 2'
According to Michael Jacobson, the former Smart Choices' panel
member who resigned due to his apprehension of the program's lax
nutritional guidelines, 222 the food industry expected to ward off federal
effective
regulation for FOP labeling by proving that it could create an
224
2 23
faces."'
their
in
up
blew
clearly
[i]t
"'
Yet,
itself.
by
system
The failure of Smart Choices epitomizes why industry selfregulation is not a solution to the obesity crisis. 22 5 The Rudd Center's
cereal study provides another valid illustration, as it emphasized that
industry self-regulation must not preclude necessary government
enforcement. 2 26 Cereal manufacturers' flimsy self-regulatory pledges
have failed to shield children from being bombarded with messages to
consume the most unhealthy foods.22 7
The Rudd Center noted that this represents a common
"phenomenon," in which industry proclaims that there is no need for
govemment action, because instead, it will improve the public health by
policing itself.228 Yet it is time that food manufacturers be held
responsible for both failing to effect meaningful changes through selfregulation, and for how their products affect consumers' health. 22 9 The
govemment must employ independent nutrition experts, with no ties to
the food industry, to establish uniform standards; otherwise the food

220. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining Jacobson's opposition to Smart
Choices).
223. William Neuman, Food Label Program to Suspend Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2009, at Bl.
224. Id. (quoting Michael Jacobson, Executive Director of the Center for Science in the Public
Interest). Jacobson noted the irony in the collapse of Smart Choices, stating that "their device for
pre-empting government involvement actually seems to have stimulated government involvement."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
226. JENNIFER L. HARRIS ET AL., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, CEREAL
F.A.C.T.S.: NUTRITION AND MARKETING RATINGS OF CHILDREN'S CEREALS (2009),
http://www.cerealfacts.org/media/CerealFACTSReportSummary.pdf.
227. Id.; RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 57, 60.
228. RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 60. This "phenomenon" occurred within the alcohol and
tobacco industries, where there was an "abject failure of self-regulation." Id. As the study noted:
"An industry suffering from negative public relations and the specter of government intervention
engages in a predictable set of responses, among them the launch of self-regulatory actions." Id.; see
also Brownell & Warner, supra note 19, at 267 (noting that there is reason to be on "high alert" of
the food industry self-regulation pledges, like the Council of Better Business Bureaus' CFBAI
initiative).
229. RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 61.
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industry's self-regulation measures will be doomed just like the efforts
made by the tobacco and alcohol industries.230
One way to ensure independently established nutritional criteria is
to "erect a higher and stronger 'firewall' between Congress and
regulatory agencies." 2 31 This restructuring could help both the industry
and the public health, because all companies would start on an equalplaying field.2 32 However, the success of this reformation depends on
Congress's willingness to revise regulations that affect FDA functions,
such as the DSHEA and the FDAMA, both of which "handicap the
agency's ability to regulate the food . . . supply." 2 33 Alternatively, the
FDA and other regulatory agencies can create a more independent work
environment by curbing the ability of government officials to take jobs
within the food industry.234 Further, agencies could require full
disclosure about conflicts of interest from advisory committee
23
Finally, the FDA "could be more sensitive to the need to
participants.23
avoid even the appearance of working hand in glove with the industries
[it] regulate[s]."236 Nevertheless, it is clear that there is one option that
simply will not work: "Food companies cannot resolve the impossible
dilemma on their own. For business reasons, they cannot-and will
not-stop making nutritionally questionable food products and
marketing them . ...

237

The Rudd Center suggested that the government follow the
example of the United Kingdom and set objective nutritional standards
that cereal manufacturers would be required to follow in order to market
their products to children.23 8 The United Kingdom employed researchers
at the University of Oxford, independent of food industry funding, to
create uniform nutrition requirements.239 Significantly, based on these
independent standards, "not one cereal that is marketed directly to
children [in the United States] would be allowed in advertising to
children on television in the United Kingdom." 24 0
Thus, the United States should emulate the United Kingdom's more
stringent, independent regulations. Similar to how the United Kingdom

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 60-61.
NESTLE, supranote 19, at 368.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 393.
See RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 15, 57, app. A at 78-80.
See id. at 57, app A. at 78-80.
See id. at 31.
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employed Oxford researchers, the United States can employ an
independent organization, like the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), to set
its nutritional criteria.24 While the FDA stated that it plans to consult
the IOM in order to create an "optimal, common approach to nutritionrelated FOP[,]" in the same breath, it also expressed its desire to work
with the food industry.24 2 Because the food industry's participation
poses such a dangerous conflict of interest, the FDA must remove the
industry from the equation.243
In order to create an effective uniform FOP standard, the U.S.
government's independent nutrition experts should adopt simplified
nutritional labels to alert consumers about the health values and risks of
products. 244 The FDA acknowledged the success of the United
Kingdom's traffic light nutrition labeling system, which marks products
with red, yellow, and green lights to rank their nutritional value. 245 This
system informs consumers by providing them with a complete
nutritional profile of products; for example, it ranks the level of fat,
saturated fat, sugar, and salt in its products, and then correlates the levels
to traffic light colors.246 Thus, the FDA should take a similar approach
and update nutrition labels to include placement of adjectives (high,
medium, or low) alongside nutritional information to aid consumers in
understanding products' nutritional information.24 7 Of the eight FOP
labeling schemes it measured, the European study 2 48 found that the
traffic light FOP labeling scheme offered the most consumer-friendly
format. 24 9 However, the study also cited a slight caveat to the traffic
241. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 226.
242. See Letter from Schneeman to the Food Industry, supra note 35; supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
243. See supratext accompanying notes 49-53.
244. See McCabe, supra note 72, at 495, 501 (suggesting the government and the food industry
join forces and that the FDA can implement "'negative labels'). Michael R. Taylor, a senior FDA
advisor, acknowledged the danger of only showing a product's benefits: "What we don't want to do
is have [FOP] information that in any way is based on cherry-picking the good and not disclosing
adequately the components of a product that may be less good." See Neuman, supra note 32
(internal quotation marks omitted).
245. See Neuman, supranote 39; FDA Cracks Down on Deceptive Food Labels, supra note 35.
246. See CDC, Comment on Proposed Rule: Food Labeling: Revision ofReference Values and
Mandatory Nutrients, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#
documentDetail?R=090000648053e4da (follow Microsoft Word icon under "Comment") (last
updated May 2, 2008); Feunekes et al., supra note 210, at 58 (explaining that green means "Go,"
yellow means "Ok," and red means "Think before you eat too much of this ... although a little bit
will never hurt" (internal quotation marks omitted)); McCabe, supranote 72, at 512-13.
247. See CDC, supra note 246; McCabe, supra note 72, at 512-13.
248. See supranotes 211-12 and accompanying text.
249. Feunekes et al., supra note 210, at 64; see also McCabe, supra note 72, at 527 (explaining
that the traffic light system links scientific evidence with nutritious eating, using a simple method to
educate consumers how to eat better diets).
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light system, noting that it is "the most inconsistent differentiator
between healthier and less healthy products." 2 50 Thus, the FDA can
attempt to tailor the traffic light system to better distinguish the
nutritional value of products, or it can look to the other successful
European FOP labeling schemes.2 51
VI.

CONCLUSION

In her Keynote Address at the 2008 National Food Policy
Conference, FDA Commissioner Hamburg noted the "alarming" obesity
rate among the American population and its consequential "staggering"
costs. 25 2 According to Hamburg, the obesity crisis "brings into sharp
focus the public health importance of food labeling as an essential means
for informing consumers about proper nutrition."2 53 Because the food
industry has shrewdly succeeded in keeping obesity on the
backburner,254 the government must shield itself from the powerful
lobbying muscle of the food industry and adopt new, objective dietary
recommendations. 25 5 As one commentator noted: "What we are
witnessing right now is a nutritional house of cards, built upon the ill
advised federal nutritional guidelines that were constructed specifically
to increase demand of corporate processed foods." 2 56 Unless the FDA
acts independently in creating FOP labels, the food industry will

250. Feunekes et al., supra note 210, at 64 ("Given that a format should be effective for all
product categories, the Multiple Traffic Light seems less ideal."). To find the most consistent format
in distinguishing between healthier and less healthy products, the researchers measured "the
difference between the highest mean difference score in perceived healthiness and the lowest mean
difference score in perceived healthiness for each labelling [sic] format." Id. at 63. The researchers
measured the perceived healthiness of a product by asking study participants to rate "How healthy is
this product to you?" on a one-to-five scale. See id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
researchers then calculated the "mean difference in perceived healthiness between the healthier and
less healthy variants of the same product category for each labelling [sic] format." Id. The
researchers used the mean difference as an indicator of whether the labeling formats helped
consumers distinguish between healthier and less healthy products. Id.
251. For an analysis of the other seven European FOP labeling schemes, see generally id.
252. Hamburg, Keynote Address, supra note 216.
253. Id.
254. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
255. See RUDD CTR., supra note 9, at 61; Smolak, supra note 29.
256. Smolak, supra note 29 ("Corrupt federal food recommendations are the crumbly
foundation upon which the massive food epidemic is built. What we need is an independent
recommendation for dietary consumption that is insulated from the lobbying power of industry.").
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continue to mislead consumers, and as a result, spread the obesity
epidemic.257
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